In this paper we revisit fundamentals of modeling and discuss the notions of models, representations, validation and verification, and many other basic concepts. We argue that the key notions about model and simulation quality, i.e. of what constitites valid simulations, can be understood and also classified using the simple concept of comparison. To arrive at this conclusion, we first discuss our basic understanding of modeling and that of the simulation process. Throughout the paper we will discuss issues related to computer simulation in full generality, but occasionally we will also refer to particular points concerning our own domain of work, agent-based simulations.
Introduction
Computer simulation has a long history in many disciplines in natural science, and recently it is gaining focus in various fields of computational science [2, 12] and social sciences [7, 6] as well. Naturally, and quite desirably, this is accompanied by a renewed interest in the methodology of computational modeling in general, and a discussion about what constitutes valid and accepted results of modeling in particular [8] . This debate is important, because the apparent differences in the way of thinking (or "modes of thought") of the natural, engineering and social sciences makes it sometimes difficult to simply import the validity concepts used in one disciplines to another, even if relying on disciplines with a long history of computer simulation.
In this paper we argue that the key concepts about valid simulations can be understood and also classified using the simple concept of comparison. To arrive at this conclusion, we first discuss our basic understanding of modeling and that of the simulation process. Throughout the paper we will discuss issues related to computer simulation in full generality, but occasionally we will also refer to particular points concerning our own domain of work, agent-based simulations [10] . 
The Model is (Not) A Pipe
We start with simple observations. In order to illuminate our understanding of what constitutes a model, we borrow a well-known metaphor from Prof. Peter Allen of Cranfield University, who uses the famous painting by René Magritte on Figure 1 to explain his students the essentials of modeling, cf. also [13] p11. The painting shows a realistic image of a pipe, plus the warning that this is not a pipe. Now, the warning is right of course, as you can never use the depicted object to have a good smoke after dinner. You cannot even grasp it for that matter, as it is lacking one dimension out of the three of everyday objects. Yet, the image is a realistic one so we can imagine that it could be used to explain to someone from another culture what a pipe looks like and what parts it consists of, etc. It may even be possible to explain using it how to make a good pipe and what are the difficulties to avoid. This is very similar to the case of modeling indeed, where the single key component of a model is simplification [1] . There is little point in creating a model if it has all the complexity of the object it is modeled after. The best model of every system is itself [4] . And that is another point; there is always a duplicity involved, that of the model (the image) and the target modeled after (the pipe). More importantly, the model has to be useful in one way or the other (explaining what a pipe is like or how to make one), or otherwise, again, there would be little point in creating the model in the first place. However, quite clearly, there are many possible uses and many possible simplifications that we can think of, so there are always an endless number of (good, i.e. functionally adequate) models of the same target.
The Many Models of a Single Computer Simulation
We go one step further. In addition to the many possible (and adequate) models of the same natural target, there are always many models connected to the same computer simulation as well. This is not simply a consequence of the iterative nature of research that produces newer and newer insights and hence improved models, albeit this property indirectly multiplies the number of models involved. More importantly however, a single computer simulation also inherently involves many different models.
Let us count them. A first model of the target is built in the brain of the modeler -this we will call the modeler's cognitive model of the target system. This is then formalized using human language, creating an (oral or written) specification delivered to the programmer involved 1 . The programmer then builds his/her own cognitive model, in turn, from which another formal representation, namely an implementation is created. Finally, the simulation is eventually executed and the work published. For the latter, a formal model description is usually created, which is again different. The publication also tends to contain the results of the simulation together with their interpretation.
The importance of this plurality of models (representations) connected to a single computer simulation is manifold. First, this is an obvious source of error and misunderstanding, especially if several persons are involved. Often we see this when modelers and programmers enter discussion.
In addition (which is more important for our present paper), the quality of the simulation work and its results are greatly affected by the possible and to some extent inevitable discrepancies between the cognitive model, the implementation and finally, the published formal model description, which are the steps of the process. The issue is obviously connected with model verification and validation, and we will come back to them later. The multiplicity of models brings up another issue, however, and this is often raised by simulation skeptics.
Wouldn't it be better, they ask, to leave out the whole programmer-implementation-formalization (computational) part altogether, and do all the modeling using just good old fashioned and reliable mathematics?
Computer Simulation as a Formal System
We do not want to re-iterate in detail the common claims in favor of computational modeling at this point (e.g., the possible intractability of the models, the often unrealistic computational assumptions about the actors, the inability to analyze non-equilibrium situations, etc.).
Rather, here we would like to point out that the entire question is wrong. At least, it is wrong when contrasting the representational power of simulations to mathematics. That is because all computer simulations are, by definition, formal mathematical models themselves. This should be obvious since all computation that is performable by today's computers can be equivalently calculated by an appropriately constructed program on a general Turing machine. Since both the Turing machine and its program are well-defined mathematical constructs, there is no reason to think that computer simulations are less formal than any other constructs of mathematics.
Since the reference to the Turing machine may seem rather vague, and Turing machines in general are rather hard to work with, we offer another metaphor here, which may be more instructive: every computer simulation can be equivalently described by an appropriately constructed Markov chain [9] .
Omitting the formal details, a Markov chain is a discrete-time stochastic process with the property that its future state only depends on its state at present (and not in the past) -in other words, the only form in which the past connects to the future is via the current state. Therefore, since the computer is an inherently discrete engine, all we need to prove to show a simulation is a Markov chain is to see that our simulation is "memory-less". But this is trivially true, since a simulation's future state can only depend on the present state of the computer's memory.
So -in an important sense, models, simulations and "good old" mathematical structures are fundamentally equivalent. Then why use the one and not the other?
Representation Matters
It is because representation matters -it is (almost) everything. Hopefully, the general argument above have convinced the reader that constructing a computational model is no less formal than using other constructs from mathematics. Yet, there are subtle differences. One is because mathematical disciplines and systems (like Functional Analysis, the Turing machine or the Markov process) come with their inherent methods of solution and well-known theorems. What the simulation skeptics really lack when asking for formalization is building on these methods and theorems. And the appropriate reason here is indeed often intractability. However, we would also like to point to another, related point: practicality. Computer simulations allow for the construction and analysis of models whose other formal equivalents (even when constructed in less-naïve ways than above) would be impractical to work with. This importance of representation may be illuminated by another simple visual metaphor. The two panels of Figure 2 show the very same picture, except that their representation (interpretation) is different. In other words, the picture of the Kiyumizudera in Kyoto is the same, but on the left it is opened in a text editor, while on the right in a picture viewer -just the rendering is different. The figure is meant to clearly show that representation matters, and that some formalization may be egregiously easier to work with in a specific problem setting than another. The latter remark is also applicable when discussing the application of different simulation paradigms (e.g., agent-based versus systems dynamics simulations).
In other words, things that are equivalent are not. Equivalent in principle does not imply equivalent in practice, in actual value. This is the point where simulations begin to be interesting, by offering the kinds of representations we can seamlessly work with in the given problem context.
Operations on Models as Comparisons
So far we have argued that there are multiple models of the same target, and a series of them is involved in any computer simulation. Then we have argued that computer simulation is nothing but a specific formalism to describe models as mathematically grounded as it gets. Yet a simulation may be a more practical tool for handling certain problems than the analytical methods, just because its representation is more amenable to the problem domain. In the following, we turn back to the quality of simulation.
The relevant literature on computer simulation, both in the natural and engineering sciences, and about social simulation, contains several different concepts and approaches to define and assess the quality of computational models. Among them are concepts of structural and phenomenological validity; verification and validation [14] , etc. In our view, all these can be understood within a very simple, unified framework.
We maintain that the quality of a model is always determined by a comparison between two different objects (models, systems, etc.). For example,
• validation checks the accuracy of the model's representation of the real system. How that is possible is by comparison of elements of the model to observations on reality. (We note that, strictly speaking, we thus compare models with more models; the set of observations or information set constitutes namely an empirical model of the real system [11] -marked by the simplifications necessary to observe one thing and not another.)
• verification [5, 15] compares the implementation of the model to that of the specification, or implicitly, to the modeler's cognitive model. Alternatively,
• in a replication of the model, we compare the results of one implementation to another, or more precisely, the results (and interpretation) of the replica, to those in the original publication.
• simulation docking is a similar enterprise that compares the end results of two chains of models of the same target.
More importantly, this comparison-based framework allows us to point out subtle differences among different approaches and their motivations to computational modeling. The different approaches enjoy a different status in the respective disciplines (i.e., engineering simulations versus artificial societies simulations; the first is well-received and standard and the second is considered controversial and experimental). They usually have their widely accepted dominant "modus operandi", albeit some disciplines allow for multiple approaches.
A Comparison-Based Taxononomy of Approaches to Model Quality
In the following we will present an incomplete taxonomy of the main approaches to model quality (See Figure 3. ) Prediction. We start with prediction, which is also probably held as most common mark of validity. It is certainly what agent-based modelers are most often forced to explain why they are not doing. In the case of prediction, the source of validity is the agreement between the state of the implementation at a future time (in simulated units) with that of the target at a future time (in real units) 2 . The requirement of prediction is natural when the purpose of the simulation is to prevent something from happening (e.g., the collapse of a building) or to give an appropriate and reliable warning (e.g., hurricane warning systems). Retrodiction. Sometimes, the ability to predict is not an applicable measure of validity, even if the simulation's motivation and purpose can be seemingly very similar. That is the case, for example, in climate change research, where the time-scale of the modeled phenomena rules out all meaningful tests of the prediction capability. (By the time it can be decided whether a given model predicts a correct picture of global warming, the window of opportunity for preventive action might well be closed.) In the case of such applications, simulation quality is assessed through a comparison based on retrospective fitting, i.e., the states of the implementation at previous times (in simulated units) is compared to the previous states of the target, and the hope is that if values in the past match, so will they in the future as well. Phenomenological simulation. A completely different approach to simulation quality is present in many engineering applications, or in Artificial Intelligence. The well-known "Turing test" [17] assumes that in order to qualify for the title of "intelligent agent", an artificial chatter robot needs to be indistinguishable by a human observer from human chatting partners. Drawing a surprising parallel, this is very similar to the case of the early history of aviation. The Wright brothers wanted to build an object that simulates a distinct property of birds: namely that of flying. In their search to achieve this goal, they have built a model of birds that mimicked very few properties of the actual birds, but reproduced the desired phenomenon itself. This approach we can call phenomenological simulation and again the comparison framework can explain it. A phenomenological simulation is one that compares a specific property of the implementation to a specific property of the target known a priori. Thought experiments. Finally, an approach very common in agent-based social simulation is what is generally called a "thought experiment" that creates existence proofs for highly theoretical questions.
A prime example is Robert Axelrod's Evolution of Cooperation model [3] . In this model, Axelrod sets out to investigate an apparent contradiction present between the elementary assumption held by many social scientists about the fundamentally selfish nature of human behavior and the high degree of altruistic behavior observed in everyday life. Axelrod concretizes this general question by studying the evolution of strategies in an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) setting. His computational model shows that it is not impossible for cooperative (altruistic) behavior to emerge and to dominate societies. That is, when assessing the quality of the model, Axelrod compares the results of his simulations to consequences of pre-existing theories/models.
Discussion
We suggest that most known computational models can be reformulated in the above way. Sometimes the reformulation has a surprising effect: it may reveal that the actual question answered by the model might not have an utter importance after all. This paradoxical consequence is because an honest formulation of this kind should list, for the comparison framework to function at all, the ceteris paribus assumptions of the model, which narrows down its applicability.
For example, Thomas Schelling's all-famous segregation model [16] sets out to answer a general theoretical question whether massive residential ethnic segregation is possible in a rather tolerant society (i.e., in a society where every individual is very tolerant towards members of different ethnicity). A different way to formulate the same question is whether intolerance (racism) is necessarily at work when we observe segregation. But to make the formulation more precise, we need to include the assumption of a discrete, two-dimensional space in the model; a step-like tolerance function, etc. Introducing these constraints, however, reformulates the question to a much less interesting, and more limited one about the specific simulation only. (Clearly the 2-grid cannot directly say much about the original question.)
Yet, this phenomenon may also be seen as an advantage (especially, since computational models help making assumptions rather explicit) as the systematic relaxation or change of the aforementioned limitations (such as the sweeping of interaction topologies) may help determining the domain of applicability of the model. Hence both the simulation framework and the comparison method can ultimately contribute to transparent, documentable, reproducible research.
Conclusion
In this paper we have re-visited basic notions of computational modeling, and introduced a simple, comparison-based framework for describing various existing approaches to assess the validity of computer simulations. We discussed four major directions in more detail: prediction, retrospective fitting or retrodiction, phenomenological simulation and thought experiments, respectively. Examples for the application of these approaches were also provided.
